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Equal Access and the First
Amendment: The Debate Behind
"Speech or Debate"
By DEBORAH A. COLEMAN*
Introduction
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the
"speech or debate clause"' absolutely barred judicial review of a rule by
which Congress grants press gallery accreditation to one class of journalists
while denying it to another. In Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
Periodical Correspondents' Association,2 journalists for Consumer Reports
sought admission to the periodical press galleries of Congress so that the
magazine could more easily gather information on national affairs of interest
to its readers. The executive committee of the Periodical Correspondents'
Association, which includes all accredited correspondents as members, ad-
ministers the galleries. The executive committee denied the request by Con-
sumer Reports because it was owned and operated by an association, Con-
sumers Union; rule two of the Rules Governing the Periodical Press Gal-
leries forbids the accreditation of any periodical that is owned and operated
by "any industry, business, association, or institution." 3 Consumers Union
sued the correspondents' association and the federal district court granted
declaratory relief. The court of appeals reversed the order, holding that any
inquiry into the validity of the rule or of the committee's action was constitu-
tionally prohibited by the doctrine of legislative immunity as embodied in
the speech or debate clause.
If the decision of the court of appeals creates the precedent it appears to
create, it will damage basic constitutional rights. By its holding, the court
closed the door to future suits challenging even more egregious forms of
discrimination by Congress against members of the press--or public. Ac-
cording to the appellate court in Consumers Union, the speech or debate
clause would bar a suit challenging a patently unconstitutional policy such
© Deborah A. Coleman, 1977.
* Member, Ohio Bar.
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, el. 1.
2. 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
3. CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 942-43, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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as the exclusion of all black reporters,4 or a suit contesting a more frivolous
selection such as the exclusion of all reporters with red hair. The court's
interpretation of the speech or debate clause would also appear to insulate
from review a congressional decision to deny all members of the press
access to particular congressional processes or information.
This catalogue of potential constitutional horrors suggests that the court
of appeals erred in its decision in Consumers Union. The speech or debate
clause cannot and should not be interpreted to permit Congress to grant
access to the press only according to its whim. There are a number of
considerations discussed in this article that might validly make a court
cautious about intervening in relations between government and the press.
The absence of standards may frustrate any decision whether an instance of
special access violates constitutional guarantees, as may the uncertain nature
and scope of a constitutional right to gather information. Furthermore, judi-
cial review may entangle a court in the resolution of questions more appro-
priately decided by the legislature.
Although discretion is dictated by these important political and con-
stitutional considerations, a court should not abdicate its responsibilities
under the First Amendment by abstaining automatically in an access case.
At the least, a court should assess carefully whether a political question is
actually presented by the facts before it. When it is consistent with the
constitutional scheme of the separation of powers, the court should render a
decision that will protect both the First Amendment right of the press to
equal access to government information and the interest of the public in a
diversity of informed opinions about the operation of its representative gov-
ernment. In Consumers Union the arguments in favor of judicial decision
were strong. The First Amendment, as it is construed to bar inhibition of
speech or publication by the press because of the content of the expression,
provided a standard against which to judge the government's duty in that
case. Further, because a judicial decision would not have interfered sig-
nificantly with the legislative process, the court would not, in making its
decision, have shown any disrespect for the separation of powers among the
coordinate branches of the federal government.
4. Black reporters were in fact excluded from the press galleries until 1947, osten-
sibly because they represented weekly rather than daily papers. Under pressure because
the Senate Rules Committee had unilaterally extended accreditation to one black reporter,
the governing committee of correspondents amended its rules to permit the accreditation
of news services for weekly journals. See Marbut, The Standing Conznittee of Correspon-
dents, in CONGRESS AND THE NEWS MEDIA 40, 45-46 (R. Blanchard ed. 1974).
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I. Consumers Union's Efforts to
Gain Admission to the Periodical
Press Galleries
"Periodical press gallery" designates a location in the Senate and in
the House of Representatives set aside for the convenience of reporters for
periodicals, and designates also the group of journalists who are accredited
to use that space and to exercise associated privileges. The periodical press
galleries are the most recently created of four sets of press galleries in
Congress.5 In the congressional galleries accredited correspondents enjoy
not only desk space, but typewriters, telephones, radio and film studios,
lounge space, and messenger and answering services. Gallery members may
call upon the assistance of the gallery staff to inform them of current con-
gressional activity and to provide them with relevant written materials.
Accredited correspondents have special parking privileges as well as access
to private elevators, a private dining room, and the Senate library.6
More important than these amenities is the superior access to gov-
ernmental sources and processes to which accredited correspondents are
entitled. Correspondents may enter the Senate President's room and the
House Speaker's lobby, where they can arrange or hold interviews with
members of Congress.7 The Senate and House leadership hold daily on-the-
record press conferences for gallery members;8 the chairmen of various
congressional committees offer weekly briefings on past and future legisla-
tion.9 Gallery members may attend congressional committee hearings and
can there receive the text of testimony to be given. Each gallery operates an
information service to which members can refer to learn about floor votes
and committee activity.'"
In addition to giving correspondents access to the legislative branch,
membership in one of the congressional press galleries is also a key to access
to the executive branch. Such membership is sometimes required for atten-
dance at news conferences held by federal departments and agencies."
5. The four are the press galleries, the periodical press galleries, the radio and tele-
vision galleries, and the photographers' galleries.
6. White, Modern Accommodation: The New Patronage?, in CONGRESS AND THE
NEWS MEDIA 50-57 (R. Blanchard ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as White].
7. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n,
365 F. Supp. 18, 21-22 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
8. Id. at 22.
9. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1975, at 88, col. 2.
10. White, supra note 6, at 53.
11. Affidavit of Gilbert Thelen, Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Period-
ical Correspondents' Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1973).
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Accreditation entitles a correspondent to "preferential access" to inter-
views, documents, and other sources of news. 2
Each press gallery is governed by a standing committee of correspon-
dents elected annually by the menibership of the gallery." These commit-
tees administer the galleries according to rules promulgated by the Senate
Rules Committee and the Speaker of the House. The committees' decisions
are subject to the approval of these authorities. Generally, the rules of the
press galleries restrict admission to bona fide correspondents of "repute in
their profession" who are not, and will not become, engaged in lbbbying or
the prosecution of claims.14 Rule two of the periodical press galleries further
restricts the number of publications that may have access to the facilities by
limiting accreditation to reporters who represent
one or more periodicals which regularly publish a substantial volume of
news material of either general or of an economic, industrial, technical or
trade character, published for profit and supported chiefly by advertising
or by subscription,["] and owned and operated independently of any
industry, business, association, or institution . 16
In November 1972, Gilbert Thelen, newly appointed Washington
editor of Consumer Reports, sought accreditation to the periodical press
galleries as a representative of that publication. Consumer Reports is the
monthly magazine of Consumers Union, a nonprofit organization whose
purpose is to provide consumers with information about consumer goods
and services. Consumers Union's primary activity is the publication of
buyers' guides and Consumer Reports, but it does occasionally present its
views on consumer issues to congressional committees and federal agencies
when invited to do so.'I Neither Consumers Union nor its employees engage
12. Id.
13. Congress delegated the responsibility for administration of the galleries to such
committees in approximately 1877, after a period in which the House gallery was under
the authority of the Speaker, and the Senate gallery was under the direction of the Senate
Rules Committee. See F. MARBUT, NEWS FROM THE CAPITAL (1971).
14. The periodical press galleries are alone in limiting to "resident" newsgatherers
the correspondents who may have access. The constitutional ramifications of this exclu-
sion are beyond the scope of this paper, but the suspect nature of such a limitation based
on residency is suggested by Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969). But see McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976);
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
15. Access for journals supported chiefly by subscription was not available until
1974. The change was made to admit "legitimate newsletters" to the galleries. Letter
from Samuel Shaffer, chairman of the executive committee of the Periodical Correspon-
dents' Association to the author (undated).
16. CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 942-43, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
17. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 6-7, Consumers Union of United States, Inc.
v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
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in the lobbying of any legislative body, and the organization has no legisla-
tive program."8 Accreditation to the periodical press galleries would have
enabled Thelen to write articles for Consumer Reports about federal ad-
ministrative, legislative, and judicial developments in the areas of consumer
protection, product safety, and consumer costs.
On the ground that Consumer Reports failed to meet the criterion of
being owned and operated independently of "any . . . association or in-
stitution," the executive committee of the Periodical Correspondents' As-
sociation denied Thelen's application. Consumers Union's subsequent at-
tempt to have the committee reconsider its rejection was unsuccessful, as
was the organization's effort to persuade the Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration and the Speaker of the House to exercise their supervisory
authority under rule five to direct that Consumer Reports be admitted to the
galleries. 9 On July 3, 1973, Consumers Union filed suit in the District
Court of the District of Columbia, naming as defendants the Periodical
Correspondents' Association and the sergeants-at-arms of the House and
Senate. Consumers Union sought a declaratory judgment that the executive
committee's action in refusing accreditation to Consumer Reports, as well as
the rule upon which the committee relied, abridged the organization's First
and Fifth Amendment rights. 0
District Court Judge Gesell granted Consumer Union's motion for
summary judgment.2' On his own motion Judge Gesell dealt with the pre-
liminary matter of the justiciability of the complaint under article I, section
six of the Constitution, the speech or debate clause. Applying the tests of
legislative immunity articulated by the Supreme Court in Gravel v. United
States"2 and Doe v. McMillan,23 the district court held that the clause would
18. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n,
365 F. Supp. 18, 23 n.10 (D.D.C. 1973). Ralph Nader recently resigned from the Con-
sumers Union board complaining that the organization did not engage enough in advo-
cacy. See Nader's letter of resignation and the response of Consumers Union Executive
Director Rhoda Karpatkin, 40 CONSUMER REPORTS 524-25 (1975).
19. By letter dated June 14, 1973, the chairman of the Senate Rules Committee,
acting upon the recommendation of the correspondents, concurred in the rejection. The
Speaker never answered Consumers Union's letter. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 18, 22 (D.D.C. 1973).
20. After the district court's opinion, the correspondents association continued to
exclude Consumer Reports. Consumers Union's efforts to obtain injunctive relief pending
the association's appeal was denied without opinion by the district court, by the court of
appeals, and by the Supreme Court. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 9, Consumers
Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
21. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n,
365 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1973).
22. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
23. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
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not bar Consumers Union's claim because the conduct of the correspon-
dents' association and the sergeants-at-arms "neither constitutes an integral
part of nor has been shown to have a significant impact upon the proceedings
on the floor of either house." 24
Passing to the merits of Consumers Union's claim, the court found that
rule two of the Rules Governing the Periodical Press Galleries, both on its
face and as applied, infringed the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The denial
to newsmen of equal access to "facts of public consequence, '"25 without a
compelling justification, violated Consumers Union's First Amendment
rights. The court stated:
The Constitution requires that congressional press galleries remain avail-
able to all members of the working press, regardless of their affiliation.
Exclusion of a publication from the galleries can only be sanctioned
under carefully drawn definite rules developed by Congress and spe-
cifically required to protect its absolute right of speech and debate or
other compelling legislative interest.2"
The court also noted that the rules were defective because of their failure to
provide for procedural due process prior to exclusion with "opportunity for
adequate impartial review wherever a publication is excluded." 2"
Upon defendants' appeal, a court of appeals panel consisting of Judges
McKinnon, Robb, and Christensen28 reversed the lower court.29 The appel-
late court's decision turned on a matter that had not even been pleaded by the
defendants below: immunity under the speech or debate clause. Like the
district court, the court of appeals applied the standards enunciated in Gravel
v. United States3 ° to determine the existence of legislative immunity. But the
court of appeals found that, for several reasons, the administration of the
press galleries was within the scope of the privilege. The Periodical Corre-
spondents' Association had acted pursuant to a delegation of the House and
Senate in furtherance of their authority to make rules under article I, section
five of the Constitution. The operation of the press galleries "occur[red] in
the regular course of the legislative process' '"" and involved no "bad faith or
illegal conduct.' '32 In support of its conclusion that the administration of the
24. 365 F. Supp. at 24.
25. Id. at 25.
26. Id. at 26.
27. Id.
28. Judge Christensen is a district court judge who was sitting by designation pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (1970).
29. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n,
515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
30. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
31. 515 F.2d at 1348.
32. Id.
(Vol. 4
press galleries was within the sphere of legislative immunity, the court relied
on two facts: for many years Congress had itself carried out this task, and the
two houses continued to supervise the decisions of the press committees.
The court of appeals also suggested that adjudication would be inappropriate
under the political question doctrine because there was present one of the
characteristics of political questions enumerated by the Supreme Court in
Baker v. Carr,33 a constitutional commitment of the resolution of the issue
to a coordinate branch of government.
H. The Scope of Speech
or Debate Clause Immunity
Whether legislative immunity attaches to the decision of congressional
agents to deny accreditation to certain members of the press is a question not
easily resolved. The court of appeals in Consumers Union did not come to
grips with the question that makes the applicability of the speech or debate
clause so difficult to assess-that is, whether, for the purposes of the clause,
a process by which members of Congress communicate with the public is
legislative activity. Rather, the court based its holding upon the correspon-
dents' good faith and the fact that the correspondents were enforcing internal
rules of Congress. This section will indicate that in light of the speech or
debate clause and the cases the Supreme Court has decided under it, these
considerations do not justify the invocation of legislative immunity. If legis-
lative immunity is appropriate in Consumers Union at all, it is for a reason
that the court of appeals did not articulate: that the accreditation of
journalists is part of the legislative process. Although accreditation might be
considered a legislative activity, the rulings of the Supreme Court support a
conclusion that it should not be so considered.
A. The Constitutional Basis of Legislative Immunity
The source of legislative immunity is article I, section six of the
Constitution, which provides in part: "for any Speech or Debate in either
House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any
Place." The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the purpose of the
clause is "to prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before
a possibly hostile judiciary." 34 If properly invoked, the clause relieves
members of Congress not only from liability, but also from defending suits
except to the extent of submitting this absolute defense. By the terms of the
clause, legislative immunity may be invoked for "speech or debate" on the
33. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
34. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169; 181 (1966).
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floor of the chamber. To the extent that the immunity reaches other conduct,
that conduct must be within the legislative sphere." More precisely, to be
protected, acts must be "an integral part of the deliberative and communica-
tive process by which Members participate in committee and House pro-
ceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of pro-
posed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution
places within the jurisdiction of either House." 36 Legislative immunity at-
taches to certain actions, rather than to particular persons. Thus, legislative
immunity will shield congressional aides who engage in conduct that would
be protected if performed by members of Congress.3 7 Conversely, for activ-
ity not within the legislative sphere, neither Congressmen nor their aides and
employees are immune from prosecution.38
B. The Court of Appeals' Analysis of Legislative Activity
The court of appeals in Consumers Union recognized that legislative
activity is the only conduct entitled to legislative immunity, and it acknowl-
edged that the correspondents' actions did not appear to be privileged con-
duct at first glance because they "were not engaged in the consideration and
passage or rejection of proposed legislation." 39 Nevertheless, the court
found that the correspondents were involved in legislative activity and were
immune from suit. The court's analysis finds little support in case law.
First, the legality and good faith of the correspondents' actions estab-
lished their protected status for the court of appeals. Reasoning that their
conduct was unlike that which had been held unprivileed-an unlawful
arrest in Kilbourn v. Thompson,"° a bribe in United States v. Brewster41-
the court concluded that the correspondents' actions must be privileged. The
legal foundation, as well as the logic of the court's analysis, is flawed. The
question of whether a particular action enjoys immunity under the speech or
35. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624 (1972).
36. Id. at 625.
37. Id. at 618.
38. The Supreme Court stated in Gravel that "both aide and Member should be
immune with respect to committee and House action leading to the illegal resolution. So,
too . . . senatorial aides should enjoy immunity for helping a Member conduct committee
hearings. On the other hand, no prior case has held that Members of Congress would be
immune if they executed an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out an illegal arrest,
or if, in order to secure information for a hearing, themselves seized the property or in-
vaded the privacy of a citizen. Neither they nor their aides should be immune from liabil-
ity or questioning in such circumstances." Id. at 621.
39. 515 F.2d at 1350.
40. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
41. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
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debate clause often arises in the context of a complaint that the action taken
is illegal or in bad faith, but the presence of either characteristic does not
determine whether a congressional defendant is absolutely immune from
suit. Allegedly illegal conduct has been protected by speech or debate clause
immunity when it has taken place on the floor of Congress or in commit-
tee.42 Conversely, without referring to bad faith or illegality, the Supreme
Court has stated that legislative immunity does not extend to other congres-
sional activities. For example, in Brewster the Supreme Court observed that
a variety of functions performed by congressmen, such as sending newslet-
ters to constituents and making speeches outside Congress, are beyond the
protection of the speech or debate clause.43 There is no suggestion that these
activities are unprivileged because they afe illegal or done in bad faith;
rather, they are unprivileged because they are not essential to legislating.
Similarly, in Doe v. McMillan, 4 the Supreme Court held that the speech or
debate clause did not bar the plaintiffs from prosecuting their suit for inva-
sion of privacy against the noncongressional defendants to the extent that
those defendants participated in the distribution of the allegedly libelous
document to the public. Such distribution "beyond the reasonable bounds of
the legislative task, enjoy[ed] no Speech or Debate Clause immunity." ' 45
The legislative task, not bad faith or illegality, defines the scope of legisla-
tive immunity.
Drawing on the reference in Gravel to "matters which the Constitu-
tion places within the jurisdiction of either House," the court of appeals in
Consumers Union held that the committee of the correspondents' association
was immune because it was enforcing internal rules of Congress, which had
been promulgated pursuant to the constitutional power of each house to
make rules for its own proceedings.46 This justification must be based on a
misreading of the case law, inasmuch as internal rules of Congress have
never been held completely insulated from suit. The fact that an action
touches on the internal affairs of Congress does not prohibit judicial review.
For example, Powell v. McCormack" involved the internal affairs of the
House; former Representative Adam Clayton Powell challenged the action
of the House in refusing to seat him and in denying him his salary. The
42. E.g., Brewster involved an allegation of bribery to perform a legislative act,
408 U.S. 501 (1972); Senator Gravel published the Pentagon Papers in possible violation
of federal law, United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
43. 408 U.S. at 512; accord, Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Pa.
1975).
44. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
45. Id. at 315.
46. 515 F.2d at 1350 (quoting 408 U.S. at 625).
47. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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Supreme Court held that Powell's suit could be maintained against the
defendants other than the congressmen. Moreover, the phrase from Gravel
upon which the court of appeals relied in Consumers Union was plucked
from its proper context in a way that distorted its meaning. Read as a whole,
the Court's opinion in Gravel states that an act is within the scope of
legislative immunity only if it both relates to legislation or to another matter
within congressional responsibility under the Constitution and is integral to
the deliberative and communicative processes. This two part limitation
coincides with and implements the Court's insistence that immunity does not
extend to every activity relating to legislative affairs or to everything done
by legislators. Instead, it is intended only to "protect the integrity of the
legislative process.''48
Because enforcement of rule two of the periodical press galleries re-
lated to a congressional rule but was not integral to the processes by which
this rule was considered and adopted, that enforcement could be the subject
of a lawsuit. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that actions taken to enforce a legislative mandate, by
whomever taken, may be the subject of a suit testing the constitutionality of
the original authorization.49
The court of appeals attempted to distinguish the leading cases permit-
ting suits challenging the enforcement of congressional resolutions-
Kilbourn v. Thompson5" and Powell v. McCormack" -by adverting to the
fact that rule two was validly enacted within the scope of specific congres-
sional authority. It is true that in both Kilbourn and Powell the Supreme
Court's opinion included a holding that Congress had exceeded its author-
ity.52 The Supreme Court's holdings with respect to the validity of the
congressional resolutions in both cases, however, were related to the merits
48. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972).
49. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); cf. Stamler v. Willis, 415 F.2d
1365 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970) (action for declaratory and in-
junctive relief from enforcement of a subpoena issued pursuant to a rule chartering the
House Un-American Activities Committee could be maintained against United States at-
torney). See also Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (suit for invasion of privacy by
the printing and public distribution of a committee report could proceed against the
superintendent of documents and against the public printer); Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486 (1969) (suit for declaration of the unconstitutionality of congressman's exclusion
from the House could be maintained against the sergeant-at-arms, the doorkeeper, and the
clerk); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (suit for damages could proceed to
trial against subcommittee counsel).
50. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
51. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
52. 103 U.S. at 196; 395 U.S. at 548.
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of the plaintiffs' cases, not to the issue of whether legislative immunity
precluded suit in the first instance. On the contrary, in these cases, as in
every other Supreme Court case under the speech or debate clause, legisla-
tive immunity was determined by the nature of the conduct, not by the
constitutionality of the underlying authorization. This distinction is clear in
the Supreme Court's opinion in Powell. The Court treated legislative im-
munity and the congressional power to exclude or expel its members in
separate sections of the opinion and decided that Powell's complaint was
justiciable without reference to the constitutionality of the order of the
House excluding the representative.
Beyond its reference to illegality and congressional rulemaking au-
thority, the court of appeals gave no more justification for its holding that
legislative immunity protected the correspondents in Consumers Union than
the unelaborated assertions that the correspondents "were engaging in a
sense in acts generally done in relation to the business before Congress"''
and that their actions "fell within 'the sphere of legislative activity.' ,,'" As
has been indicated above, the fact that an action is taken either by legislators
or in relation to legislative affairs does not necessarily mean that such
conduct is "legislative activity" for the purpose of speech or debate clause
immunity. The questions then arise what the test of legislative activity is and
whether the accreditation of correspondents meets this test.
C. Relations With the Press as Legislative Activity
The inconsistency of the appellate court's reasoning with the opinions
of the Supreme Court reflects a fundamental doctrinal tension; certain ac-
tivities that are legislative activities as a matter of fact are not considered
such by the Supreme Court as a matter of law. Relations with the press fall
into precisely this category. Communications with the press are a usual and
necessary part of a legislator's work. The Supreme Court, however, has
never considered such communications to be privileged.
If legislative activities are defined for the purposes of the speech or
debate clause immunity as any activities that are "necessary to fulfill one of
the goals of representative government," 55 then accreditation of journalists
53. 515 F.2d at 1350.
54. Id.
55. Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86
HARV. L. REv. 1113, 1146 (1973). This article presents a full historical justification for
an application of the functional approach to the determination of what activity is
privileged under the speech or debate clause. The authors recommend that an exception to
speech or debate immunity be carved out for cases in which an infringement of constitu-
tional rights is alleged.
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must be viewed as legislative activity. To perform their representative roles
legislators require informed guidance from the electorate. To this end, legis-
lators must perform an informing function; they must communicate to the
public what they perceive to be important issues and how they, as well as the
legislature and the administrative agencies, are approaching these issues.
Legislators also must have a means for learning the public reaction to the
information disclosed and for ascertaining their constituents' desires.
Congress itself performs an informing function by the publication of
the Congressional Record, committee reports, and other documents. The
exchange of correspondence between congressmen and their constituents
serves both the informing and the expressive functions. It is the press,
however, which is the primary agency by which Congress discloses its
activity and obtains public guidance. As one student of the relations between
Congress and the press has observed: "The American Fourth Estate operates
as a defacto, quasi-official fourth branch of government, its institutions no
less important because they have been developed informally and, indeed,
haphazardly." 6 Since by this reasoning congressional communication with
the public constitutes legislative activity, the choice Congress makes of the
agents by which it will communicate with the public should also be consid-
ered legislative activity. This notion that by accrediting journalists Congress
is selecting agents to perform its informing function would justify the hold-
ing of the court of appeals in Consumers Union.
Despite the important and prominent role of publicity in the legislative
process, however, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the proposi-
tion that congressional communications to the public are immunized by the
speech or debate clause. Rather, the Court has held that such activities as
holding a hearing"r or giving a speech to Congress 58 are "purely legislative
activities,"5 " whereas the issuance of news releases or newsletters to con-
stituents and the delivery of speeches outside Congress are not legislative
activities and are not privileged.6" The distribution of a committee report to
Congress has been protected while its distribution to the public was not.6
In view of the Supreme Court's resistance to extending legislative immunity
to congressional communications with the public, it must be concluded that
56. D. CATER, THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 13 (1959). See also
CONGRESS AND THE NEWS MEDIA (R. Blanchard ed. 1974); L. SIGAL, REPORTERS
AND OFFICIALS (1973).
57. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
58. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
59. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972).
60. Id.
61. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
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congressional communications with the press and accreditation of certain
members of the press are not privileged either.
The Supreme Court's decision not to rely on the actual workings of
Congress as its sole guide for defining the scope of legislative immunity is
supported by policy considerations relating to the preservation of constitu-
tional rights. The Supreme Court has rejected the contention that when
constitutional rights are infringed an exception to legislative immunity must
be made,62 but the salutory effect of the Court's exclusion of congressional
communications with the public from the scope of legislative immunity is to
permit the vindication of such rights. In its communications with the press
and public, Congress is particularly likely to infringe constitutional rights
without justification. The public distribution of committee hearings and
reports may cause, for example, an invasion of privacy" or a chilling effect
on speech.64 Similarly, an official's actions in giving information to one
journal or kind of journal but not to another infringes First Amendment
values, both by limiting the diversity of informed opinions to which the
public has access and by discouraging expressions of disapproval by the
favored publications.65
The Supreme Court has limited speech or debate immunity to those
activities "essential" to the legislative process, carefully defining "essen-
tial" in a way that has disallowed unwarranted disregard of the rights of
citizens by members of Congress as they communicate with the public.
Therefore, the interpretation given by the court of appeals to the speech or
debate clause is inconsistent both with the policy of the clause and with the
interpretation given it by the Supreme Court.
I. Issues in the Adjudication of
Equal Access Claims
How courts should adjudicate press claims of discriminatory access to
government information is a more complex problem than is apparent from
62. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509-10 (1975).
63. E.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
64. Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1970) (enjoining public distribu-
tion of report of House Committee on Internal Security about the sources of financing for
the revolutionary movement in the United States).
65. See Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 867, 913
(1972): "An outright denial of press credentials is a much more obvious means of restrict-
ing access. If this denial is politically motivated, it may have several side effects. Clearly
the number of viewpoints in the news may be limited, especially since reporters who are
outspokenly critical, such as those representing the underground press, are most likely to
be denied credentials. Furthermore, the implicit threat of denial will not be lost on other
reporters. It will undoubtedly be felt as a chilling effect."
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the opinion of the court of appeals in Consumers Union. Two questions arise
in any challenge to the constitutionality of a practice by which a government
official grants or denies access to information to selected reporters. The first
question relates to the justiciability of the claim. Can "the duty asserted...
be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined and [can] protec-
tion for the right asserted. . . be judicially molded"?"6 The second inquiry
relates to the propriety of adjudicating the claim. Is judicial resolution of a
dispute between members of the press and government officials consistent
with our political scheme? Only when both questions can be answered
affirmatively is review of an access case appropriate.
A. Finding a Constitutional Duty: First Amendment Equal Protection
An identifiable duty is breached when congressional agents deny a
journalist equal access to government information because of the affiliation
of his journal; the freedom of the press is thus abridged in violation of the
First Amendment. Whatever the right of the press to access to a particular
government source, once some members of the press are given access,
others cannot be excluded for reasons relating to the content of their publica-
tions.
At the outset, it is necessary to set to one side the duties of the govern-
ment under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)Y Unquestionably,
journalists and the public in general must be given access to information
covered by that act. The FOIA does not assist a journalist seeking the
information to which he would be privy as an accredited member of a
congressional press gallery, however, because the act imposes a duty to
disclose on administrative agencies only, not on Congress. 8 Furthermore,
the FOIA gives access only to documentary materials and descriptions of the
organization and functions of each agency;69 it does not give a right of
access to deliberations or other oral communications. 0
The present articulation of a constitutional right to information provides
66. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by 5 U.S.C.A. § 552
(Supp. 4, pt. 1, Dec. 1976).
68. The act provides: "Each agency shall make available to the public information
as follows: . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
69. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)-(2), (b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by 5
U.S.C.A. § 552 (Supp. 4, pt. 1, Dec. 1976).
70. In a pending suit, several newsmen are asserting that the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act authorizes them to obtain a transcript of a background briefing given by Henry
Kissinger to which they were not invited. If, as is usually the case, no transcript had been
made of the briefing, the journalists' claim would have little foundation. See N.Y. Times,
March 7, 1975, at I, col. 8.
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little more assistance to an excluded newsman than does the Freedom of
Information Act. Although the Constitution nowhere expressly protects the
gathering of information, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that a lim-
ited privilege to do so derives from the First Amendment protection for
freedom of speech and of the press: "without some [First Amendment]
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscer-
ated.''' The Court has addressed this right only to say what it does not
include, however. Recent cases suggest that the press has no right to the best
means of gathering information, at least not when the barrier to the best
means serves a substantial state interest and is imposed on the press and
public alike.
Thus, in Pell v. Procunier7 ' prisoners and journalists challenged as
unconstitutional a regulation of the California prison system that prohibited
the press from conducting face-to-face interviews with inmates. The only
persons permitted to visit prisoners were members of their families, clergy,
their attorneys, and friends or prior acquaintances.7 3 The Court rejected the
First Amendment claims of both sets of plaintiffs. The prisoners suffered no
infringement of First Amendment rights of free speech, the Supreme Court
held, because their speech was restricted in the interest of a substantial state
policy. Furthermore, they had available alternate means of communicating
with the press through the persons who were permitted to visit them. The
First Amendment rights of the journalists were not abridged by the regula-
tion because they had not been treated any differently from other members
of the public, and the Constitution does not "require government to accord
the press special access to information not shared by members of the public
generally. "74
The holding of Pell seems to make groundless a journalist's challenge
of the unconstitutionality of his exclusion from a news conference or news-
worthy event. The excluded journalist arguably has suffered no injury inas-
much as he has some access to government proceedings by means of both
official records and the reports of journalists who were given access. Fur-
thermore, in the absence of statute, the public has no right to demand and the
government has no obligation to give information or access to government
proceedings, nor does the journalist have such a right. An official's choice to
grant access to some journalists is a matter of political discretion, and the
benefit of access is an unenforceable privilege.
71. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). See Note, The Constitutional
Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1977).
72. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
73. Id. at 824-25.
74. Id. at 834-35.
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Sometimes, however, the press is permitted to gather information as
the "necessary representative of the public's interest . . and the instru-
mentality which effects the public's right.'"'" In such cases the problem of
lack of judicial standards is simply recast, not removed. The press has been
permitted special access when, for practical or policy reasons, the public en
masse should not have access to, but should have information about, a
matter of public interest. Special access for the press is then justified as a
means less drastic than total exclusion, which reconciles the state interest
and the public right to know."6 The application of this principle to any
particular case requires the resolution of two threshold questions: (1) To what
governmental information does the press have a right of access as the repre-
sentative of the public; and (2) Who is the press? At first, it would seem that
officials have as much discretion to determine who the press is under this
"special right of access" theory as they have to select journalists under a
"no special right of access" theory (as when a government figure gives an
interview to one journalist).
In fact, defining the press to exclude a class of ostensibly undesirable
journalists is exactly what the Periodical Correspondents' Association did in
Consumers Union . But in reality officials do not have complete discretion
to decide who will have access to information and events of public interest.
The selection or definition of the press must be valid under First Amendment
standards whenever distinctions based solely on content are alleged. To
assure the development of political opinion and to permit the fulfillment of
each individual, the First Amendment protects the freedom of speech and
press from censorship. As the Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he essence of
this forbidden censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive
75. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 864 (1974) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing).
76. See Note, The Public's Right to Know: Pell v. Procunier and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 829 (1975); Comment, The Right of the
Press to Gather Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 181-82
(1975); Comment, Bans on Interviews of Prisoners: Prisoner and Press Rights After Pell
and Saxbe, 9 U.S.F. L. REv. 718, 729-33 (1975).
77. Defining the press to exclude unwanted journalists was also the means of deny-
ing access used in Los Angeles Free Press v. City of Los Angeles, 9 Cal. App. 3d 448,
88 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1970), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 982 (1971). City and county officials
issued press passes to reporters giving them access to areas not generally open to the pub-
lic, such as the scenes of crimes, fires, and natural disasters, as well as police press con-
ferences. The Los Angeles Free Press was denied a pass because it was not regularly
engaged in the reporting of "spot, hard core police-beat and fire news," but rather re-
ported such events with a focus "largely on sociological considerations." 9 Cal. App. 3d
at 452-53, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 608. The California court of appeals upheld the denial against
challenges based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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activity because of its content would completely undercut the 'profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' "78 The prohibition against censorship
because of content establishes what may be termed a standard of "First
Amendment equal protection" for speech. Every person's opinion must be
treated equally; the government may neither assess a penalty nor accord an
advantage to some persons because of the content of their opinions.7" Spe-
cifically, if some persons are afforded an opportunity to present their views,
other persons cannot be denied such an opportunity because of what they
have to say.
The standard of First Amendment equal protection applies regardless of
whether the opportunity the government gives for expression or related
activity is a right or a privilege."0 The event that triggers judicial review is
permission to some persons or groups to engage in expressive activity.
Thus, in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,"1 the Supreme Court
struck down a city ordinance that prohibited all picketing within a certain
distance of schools except for peaceful picketing relating to a labor dispute.
The Court held:
Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups,
government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the
basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public
forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by
reference to content alone.82
Although giving selective access to information does not prevent excluded
persons from speaking or writing, it renders their right to do so substantially
less valuable. A restriction on information gathering has a direct impact on
the content of the excluded person's expression by limiting the first-hand
78. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
79. See id.; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576 (1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Staub v. Bax-
ley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). But see Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (no violation of free speech or equal
protection rights in city's selling card space in public transit cars for commercial advertis-
ing but not for paid political advertising); Jewish Defense League, Inc. v. Washington,
347 F. Supp. 1300 (D.D.C. 1972) (no violation of First Amendment rights in statute pre-
cluding street demonstrations within 500 feet of embassies, except picketing in connection
with labor disputes at construction sites; United States' obligation to protect the persons
and property of diplomats is a compelling state interest justifying the restrictions im-
posed).
80. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
81. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
82. Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
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information available to him.8" When a person (or journal) cannot present an
informed opinion because of his exclusion from certain information as a
result of selective access policies, a fundamental aim of the First Amend-
ment is threatened; the development of American politics and culture is
hampered when excluded journals cannot contribute knowledgable views to
the forum of ideas. Therefore, to protect against violation of the First
Amendment, the standards of First Amendment equal protection may be
invoked to test the validity of selective access. This is true not only when
selection is admittedly made according to content, but also when selection is
made according to ostensibly objective criteria such as prestige or size or
circulation. Such selection is, in effect, selection according to content be-
cause the greater the circulation of a journal and the greater its prestige, the
greater the likelihood that it represents the mainstream of public opinion.
Theoretically, then, the First Amendment right to equal access might
be invoked to challenge every case of selective access, but there are practical
and policy reasons for stopping short of that extreme. First, havoc would be
worked upon the many processes by which officials communicate with
members of the press. For example, the President may choose to give an
exclusive interview to a reporter from a journal whose views he favors. It
would be impossible to grant a satisfactory remedy to every other journalist
who claimed he had been denied a constitutional right of access. The absurd-
ity of the situation is immediately clear; a meeting between the President
and all interested journalists would lack the intimacy and informality of an
exclusive interview, and imposing a duty on the President to give an equiva-
lent interview to each complaining journalist would leave him little time to
do anything else. In addition to the problem of virtual impossibility of
implementation, the extension of a right of equal access in every instance in
which the press meets with officials might actually impede the flow of
information through the press to the public. Aside from legislative debates
on the floor and committee hearings, many sources of information about
government activities might simply cease operating due to the impossible
burden of strict equal access.
It must be noted that many of the methods by which officials communi-
cate with the press are entirely within the discretion of the officials. As one
observer has noted, "A senior official's control of timing of press confer-
ences has no limit: he can simply dispense with the bother altogether." 84
Although the need of officials for press coverage and opinions makes it
unlikely that the enforcement of a right of equal access will result in a
83. E.g., Forcade v. Knight, 416 F. Supp. 1025, 1031 (D.D.C. 1976).
84. L. SIGAL, REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS 110 (1973).
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significant reduction of the opportunities for journalists to communicate with
officials, the possibility that legislators and administrators may "dispense
with the bother altogether" must be taken into account in defining the scope
of the right. Because of the impracticality and undesirability of a right. of
equal access in every case, it is necessary that there be some limitation of the
right. But articulating just when public representatives have a duty to give
equal access to members of the press is difficult in view of the innumerable
modes of communication the two groups possess. The cases involving ac-
cess to a public forum, relied on to derive a right of equal access, are not
useful analogues for determining precisely when the right of access to in-
formation applies. It is much easier to ascertain when the right to speak has
been burdened by discrimination in providing the forum than it is to ascer-
tain when the right to publish has been burdened by selective grants of
access to governmental processes and information. In determining the
boundaries of the right to equal access, it is helpful to consider the following
suggested criteria: does the advantage given relate to information; what is
the intent of the officials; are official policies of selection drawn narrowly
and enforced uniformly; and is equal access practical and supported by
justifications that outweigh those for exclusion?
The first question is whether the advantages given to some by the
government relate directly to information and are therefore cognizable under
the First Amendment. When particular newsmen are granted amenities, such
as parking permits, or are personally consulted in policy decisions, the
injury to the excluded journalists is arguably too remote to present a justici-
able complaint. The difficulty with this common sense criterion is that the
boundaries between information, amenities, and participation may be
difficult to ascertain. A press release, for example, is an amenity to the
extent that it saves the journalist the trouble of obtaining the information by
investigation or interview. It is a means of enlisting journalists' participation
in policy decisions to the extent that it funnels proposals through journalists
to test public reaction; and it is, as well, a communication of information.
Newsmen denied access to press releases should be able to challenge the
constitutionality of the denial under the First Amendment, and the require-
ment that the privilege denied be germane to information does not suffice to
define the constitutional duty in this instance.
Whether officials intend that what they say or do before a group of
newsmen be made public might be a second criterion for determining when
there should be a right of equal access. At times, officials present informa-
tion to the press that is to be made public. On other occasions, officials'
remarks are intended to be the background for, rather than the subject of, the
journalists' reporting. The purpose of these sessions may be to obtain sym-
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pathetic comment s . or sympathetic silence 6 from the press. There are two
significant problems, however, with the theory that an official's intent to
publicize should distinguish those situations in which there is a right of equal
access. Official unwillingness to have complete publicity is involved in
every case of selective access and provides little guidance for distinguishing
among these cases. Moreover, referring to the state of mind of an official to
determine when First Amendment principles may apply seems antithetical to
the First Amendment's prohibition against making a speech-related privilege
conditional upon the uncontrolled will of an official.8 7 Nonetheless, the
intent of officials to discriminate against journalists with particular opinions
is an important means by which to distinguish cases requiring equal access
from those that do not. Using the standard of discriminatory intent a court
may subject to constitutional scrutiny instances in which officials have estab-
lished policies whose purpose is to exclude certain journalists from access to
information, and may relieve from scrutiny situations, such as a casual en-
counter between an official and a reporter, that result in a useful tip for the
journalist. Official intent to discriminate against certain views is a useful
criterion, but it cannot be made the sole test of a breach of the constitutional
duty to give equal access. Some situations, such as the exclusive presidential
interview mentioned above, .seem to contain the element of purposeful dis-
crimination but are inappropriate subjects for judicial review.8 " On the other
hand, in a case like Consumers Union, it may be hard to prove intentional
discrimination against unpopular opinions but proper to enforce a right of
equal access.
A closer examination of that troublesome example, the exclusive presi-
dential interview, and a comparison with the Consumers Union situation
does suggest some firm and reliable means for distinguishing cases in which
officials have breached a duty to give equal access from those in which there
is no duty and no breach. The exclusive interview is problematic simply
because it is and must be exclusive; but it is impossible to say with certainty
that unconstitutional discrimination according to content has occurred. So it
may be assumed that one important characteristic of cases involving a duty
85. See D. CATER, THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 134 (1959);
HOHENBERG, THE NEWS MEDIA 97 (1968). See also McCartney, Must the Media be
"Used"?, in OUR TROUBLED PRESS 141 (A. Balk & J. Boylan eds. 1971).
86. E.g., Arnold, CIA Tried To Get Press To Hold Up Salvage Story, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 20, 1975, at 31, col. 1.
87. E.g., Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1957); Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290, 293 (1951).
88. Courts that have found a right to equal access in particular cases have been
careful to note that the right is limited; it does not mean that if one reporter gets an inter-
view, all should. See Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768. 777 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
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to give equal access is that communication to more than one journalist is
feasible. Furthermore, the duty to give equal access applies only to situa-
tions in which, unlike the presidential interview, content-related discrimina-
tion can be discerned; the person or persons excluded having in common
specific opinions or opinion-related characteristics, such as regional or na-
tional origin or institutional affiliation.
Unlike the selection involved in granting the more or less random,
occasional exclusive interview, officials sometimes claim that it is practical
to admit some but not all journalists and they devise standards for admis-
sion, such as whether the information to be provided is necessary to a
journal's work,89 or whether a journal is affiliated with persons or institu-
tions that have business with the controlling officials. ° When there are such
standards, the First Amendment requires that they be drawn clearly and
enforced uniformly, without arbitrariness. Courts have found a breach of a
constitutional duty of equal access when officials have applied vague ac-
creditation standards9' or have arbitrarily administered their rules in a way
that made distinctions according to content.92 Therefore, where there is a
justifiable state interest in systematically excluding some journalists from
access to government information, there arises a definable duty to conform
the methods of exclusion to standards that are constitutional insofar as they
do not intentionally discriminate on the basis of content and are not so vague
or arbitrarily administered as to work such a discrimination.
B. A Question of Politics: Should the Courts Decide?
Assuming that First Amendment rights are abridged by the conduct of a
public official in denying access to government information and processes to
one group of correspondents based on the content of their journals, there
remains the difficult question whether courts should intervene. Several as-
pects of the selective access issue suggest that it may be an inappropriate
matter for judicial review, but the need for such review requires that it be
undertaken in certain cases.
Relations between officials and the press are complex and eminently
89. E.g., Los Angeles Free Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 9 Cal. App. 3d
448, 88 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 982 (1971).
90. E.g., Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Consumers Union
of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1051 (1976).
91. Forcade v. Knight, 416 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1976).
92. Main Road v. Aytch, 522 F.2d 1080 (3d Cir. 1975).
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political.93 News correspondents are "the sources and channels of informa-
tion among members of Congress and among Congress and the public and
other agencies of government." 94 The press can influence the selection as
well as the resolution of national issues. Aware of the political role of the
press, officials choose the journalists to whom they will open their proceed-
ings or their thoughts according to the degree of cooperation and friendship
each journal and reporter has shown, the audience that the officials want to
reach, and the amount of respect and credibility that each journal has dem-
onstrated in the target audience. Courts are understandably reluctant to
become involved in distinguishing among the various relations between
officials and the press for the purpose of enforcing or refusing to enforce
constitutional duties. Intervention in this area is likely to lead a court to the
point of making arbitrary distinctions and of infringing upon the preroga-
tives of the other branches of government. Most suits challenging selective
access therefore seem to present a "political question" by the terms of
Baker v. Carr,95 since resolution of the issues in such cases would seem
impossible "without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion."96
Like the articulation of a constitutional duty, the development of a
constitutionally acceptable remedy might encroach on the discretion of the
other branches as well. A court might hazard some affirmative guidance
about what the proper priorities might be for adjusting the number of corre-
spondents to the available facilities, offering, perhaps, an analogy to the
diversity standards that are applied in another limited government-regulated
forum, the airwaves. 97 It would be impossible and undesirable in terms of
the judicial role, however, for a court to specify how such a standard should
be applied or to supervise the allocation of space or time among reporters
from hundreds, perhaps thousands, of news gathering entities.
93. See generally CONGRESS AND THE NEWS MEDIA (R. Blanchard ed. 1974); F.
MARBUT, NEWS FROM THE CAPITAL (1971); D. MATHEWS, U.S. SENATORS AND
THEIR WORLD (1960); D. NIMMO, NEWSGATHERING IN WASHINGTON (1964); D.
CATER, THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (1959).
94. Blanchard, Preface to CONGRESS AND THE NEWS MEDIA at x (R. Blanchard
ed. 1974).
95. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
96. Id. at 217.
97. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 309 (West Supp. 4, 1976), and cases thereunder (suggesting
that the public interest and convenience is furthered by diversity in licensing); e.g., Citi-
zens Comm. v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also 47 U.S.C.A. § 315 (West
Supp. 4, 1976) (requiring broadcasters to afford reasonable opportunity for discussion of
opposing viewpoints on questions of public interest) applied in, e.g.. Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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Furthermore, the value of seeking judicial rulings on issues of selective
access is questionable. Judicial decisions are always weighed as precedent.
Court-approved definitions of who constitutes the press and of situations in
which equal access is required can result in unsatisfactory inflexibility..For
example, one can imagine a court endorsing a definition of the press that
includes only "bona fide correspondents of repute in their profession,"
whose income is obtained from their work as correspondents,98 only to face
the complaint of a new and serious scholar of the legislative process who has
been excluded from the press gallery on the basis of these criteria.
Even if a court is willing to risk arbitrariness, judicial intervention may
be neither necessary nor consistent with the constitutional scheme mandated
by the First Amendment. Journalists have a weapon sometimes more potent
than a court order-the power of the press. Editorial pressure has been
successful several times in the past in securing modification of exclusionary
policies of government officials;99 this tool continues to be available. Con-
signing the press to defend itself solely through its power to expose and
criticize is, Justice Stewart suggests, entirely consistent with the constitu-
tional scheme:
The press is free to do battle against secrecy and deception in govern-
ment. But the press cannot expect from the Constitution any guarantee
that it will succeed. . . .The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of
Information Act nor an official secrets act. The Constitution. . . estab-
lishes the contest, not its resolution. Congress may provide a resolution,
at least in some instances, through carefully drawn legislation. For the
rest, as so often in our system, we must rely on the tug and pull of the
political forces in American society." °
The "tug and pull" of political forces will not necessarily produce a
happy result in a case of selective access, however. In many cases, officials
have complete control over access to information and can grant access on
their own terms: "The clamor for access gives the official in demand a
measure of control: 'It is impossible to grant everyone access and therefore
the access that can be granted must be carefully and painstakingly deter-
98. This is the gist of the qualifications set down by other press galleries in Con-
gress. See CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 872-73, 912-13, 925-26, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976).
99. For example, when the Senate in 1838 amended its rules to exclude out-of-
town newspapers from the press gallery, the press raised a tremendous outcry against the
blow to the "rights of reporters." Over a year later, the Senate bowed to the newspapers'
pressure and revised the rule to permit bona fide reporters from newspapers outside
Washington to have gallery privileges. F. MARBUT, NEwS FROM THE CAPITAL 55-62
(1971).
100. Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975).
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mined.' "'' If there is no judicial review of the process by which officials
select those journalists who will be given access, and if, as a consequence,
journals representing diverse opinions do not have access to officials and
official proceedings, the information and variety of opinions available to the
public will be less than would otherwise be the case. And, as one journalist
has noted, when officials such as the President are on friendly terms with
members of the press (as could easily be the case when access is limited),
there is "a potential but serious danger that improved relations between the
President and the press will result in less, not more information for the
public."' 2 Reporters may be tempted to withhold information whose dis-
closure seems certain to offend the official.
Leaving equal access questions to be resolved by the political process is
also unsatisfactory because the journals and journalists who are usually
excluded lack political leverage. Journals denied access because of their
content will most likely be those that represent minority viewpoints. Such
journals are generally not in a position to influence officials to change their
policies.
Despite these misgivings about allowing a selective access case to
escape adjudication through use of the "political question" exception, the
uncertain nature of the constitutional right to gather information and the
problems created when a court dictates to the legislature or the executive
how to handle its press relations suggest that the issue of a denial of access
may indeed fall into that category. In fact, the court of appeals in Consumers
Union considered that the exclusion of the journal was a political ques-
tion,"'2 and the district court, in granting judgment for the plaintiffs, had
found it necessary to determine that no political question was involved
before proceeding to a decision on the merits." 4 It is contended, however,
that when a journal is denied access to government sources because of its
content, the denial can and should be reviewed by a court. The First
Amendment prohibition against penalizing expression solely because of its
content provides a standard for review. The fact that the journals most likely
to be the subject of discrimination are relatively powerless in the political
arena provides the justification. Therefore the argument is only substantial,
101. L. SIGA'L, REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS 53 (1973) (quoting G. Reedy, Speak-
ing For the President, in THE VOICE OF GOVERNMENT 106 (Hibert & Spitzer eds.
1968)).
102. Paper, All the President's Friends, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1975, at 29, col. 2.
103. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n,
515 F.2d 1341, 1346-47 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
104. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n,
365 F. Supp. 18, 23-24 (D.D.C. 1973).
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but not compelling, that providing selective access to government informa-
tion presents a political question that is nonjusticiable. The need to vindicate
First Amendment rights outweighs the uncertain and possibly negligible
damage to the separation of powers doctrine that might attend adjudication
of such an issue.
IV. Adjudication of Consumers Union's Claim
By relying incorrectly on the speech or debate clause, the court of
appeals in Consumers Union completely avoided the difficult political and
freedom of press questions the case presented, as analyzed and discussed
above. In brief, the court could first have addressed the problem of finding a
constitutional duty to give access. This is difficult because the press may not
assert a right greater than that of the public. But the First Amendment does
prohibit the government from denying a person advantages, such as access
to a public forum, because of his beliefs or opinions, and a constitutional
right of equal access for the press may be derived by analogy from that First
Amendment command. It would then have been necessary to determine
whether a court should intervene in such controversies between government
and the press-the "political question" issue. Had the court of appeals
reached these issues it would have determined that plaintiff's constitutional
rights had been violated in Consumers Union and that it was entitled to a
remedy. By rule two of the Rules Governing the Periodical Press Galleries,
Congress has excluded from the galleries journals that are affiliated with "an
industry, business, association, or institution."' 5 This rule and its applica-
tion to Consumer Reports violate the journal's First Amendment rights by
denying it accreditation.
The foregoing discussion establishes that when it is practical for many
journalists to have access to government information, no journalist can be
excluded because of the content of his publication. The denial of access to
Consumer Reports has all the indicia of unlawful exclusion in violation of
the First Amendment. First, the advantages from which Consumer Reports
has been excluded do relate to information. Members of the press galleries-
are provided special seating in the galleries so that they may have uninter-
rupted viewing of congressional debates.'" 6 Members are also granted ex-
clusive permission to attend daily press conferences held by Senate and
House leaders, and membership in the galleries facilitates access to press
105. CONGRESSIONAL DIREcToRY 942-43, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
106. This privilege must not be dismissed as a mere amenity because only obser-
vers in the press galleries may write while sitting in the gallery and remain seated con-
tinuously.
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conferences at the White House and at administrative agencies."'0 The bur-
den on the ability of "affiliated" journals to gather information admittedly is
not the most onerous conceivable; representatives of these journals still have
recourse to the Congressional Record and other publications and documents
as well as to the statements of various officials. On the other hand, undoubt-
edly there is information that is not accessible through these alternative
channels. Moreover, although the Supreme Court has not addressed the
question of equal access among publications, its cases on equal access for
individuals do not consider whether there are alternative forums available,
but only whether the government has acted in a discriminatory fashion with
respect to the forum in dispute."' 8
Congress can accommodate many journalists and desires the publicity
of its processes and deliberations. A large number of journalists are accred-
ited to the galleries; several journals have more than one correspondent and
some have as many as twenty.' 09 For these journalists, the House and Senate
provide extensive facilities."' Journals that are owned and operated by an
industry, business, association, or institution are more likely to voice
stronger, less popular opinions than commercially operated journals because
the latter appeal to and rely on a broader spectrum of readers."'
The vagueness of the standard in rule two of the gallery rules permits
the executive committee of the Periodical Correspondents' Association to
grant or deny access according to its approval of the content of an applicant
journal. The chairman of the executive committee admitted that the commit-
tee's decisions are in fact made on this basis, acknowledging that the admin-
istration of rule two involves scrutiny of "not only the content of [an
applicant's] publication, but of the purpose of its parent association as
well.""'2 The roster of periodical press gallery members confirms that the
107. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n,
365 F. Supp. 18, 22 (D.D.C. 1973).
108. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); cf. Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169 (1972) (struck down state college's denial of official recognition to a local chapter of
the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)). But see Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
117 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). In the latter two cases, the
Court upheld flat bans on face-to-face interviews of state (Pell) and federal (Washington
Post) prisoners, emphasizing that because alternative means of contacting the press were
available, restrictions on face-to-face interviews did not violate prisoners' First Amend-
ment rights.
109. See CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 955-58, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
110. See text accompanying notes 5-12 supra.
111. See T. PETERSON, MAGAZINES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 445-48
(1964).
112. Affidavit of Donald E. Smith, cited in Consumers Union of United States,
Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 18, 23 (D.D.C. 1973). This kind
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rule permits selections that are arbitrary, if not discriminatory, according to
content. The thrust of rule two seems to be to give access only to those
journals owned or operated by institutions whose primary business is that of
publishing. Since Consumer Reports accounts for most of the revenues and
expenditures of Consumers Union, the journal arguably fits the standard of
rule two. Nevertheless, Consumer Reports was excluded from the galleries.
At the same time, trade journals such as Agricultural Services, Chain Store
Age, Leather and Shoes Magazine, and Oil and Gas Journal have accredita-
tion because they are published by commercial printing houses."'
Rule two could be upheld only if the government showed that it bears a
substantial relation to a compelling government interest114 and that it is the
least restrictive way to serve that interest.1" 5 Clearly, some definition or
selection of the press must be made among the hundreds of magazines that
are potential applicants to the periodical press galleries." 6 The apparent
purpose of rule two is to make this selection in a way that will extend the
benefits of access to those for whom it will be of most value-journals that
cover some aspect of national affairs for the general public, as opposed to
journals published for the benefit of a particular group of employees or
of discretion has been censured in a number of cases; e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). In addition
to other arguments that rule two works an unconstitutional discrimination, there may be
an argument that the very criterion of affiliation abridges the First Amendment right of
free association. The basis for such an argument would be Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23 (1968), in which the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Ohio election law that
precluded small political parties from offering presidential candidates on the ballot unless
they first complied with certain conditions more onerous than those imposed on the two
major parties. The Court found that the law burdened the right of members of small par-
ties to associate and to vote effectively. The disabilities of rule two; it might be argued,
similarly burden the freedom of association of the members of Consumers Union by in-
hibiting their pursuit of one of the main purposes for which they joined together-the
collection of information relevant to their concerns.
113. CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 955-59, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The
weight the executive committee gives to content is apparent, too, from the difficulties that
Hard Times and The Village Voice had in securing gallery accreditation. Comment, Has
Branzburg Buried the Underground Press?, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 181, 182
(1973).
114. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438-39 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
115. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488 (1960), and cases cited therein at 488-89.
116. "Hundreds" may be a conservative estimate. There are approximately 16,000
magazines in the United States, of which 8,000 are industrial and house organs, and
2,400 are business publications sent to buyers and suppliers. J. TEBBEL, THE AMERICAN
MAGAZINE: A COMPACT HISTORY 243 (1969).
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students-and will deny the privilege of access to those who will use it for
purposes unrelated to newsgathering, specifically, lobbying.
The weight of these goals and the substantiality of their connection to
rule two is suspect because rule two is overinclusive and underinclusive as to
both of them. Rule two excludes many journals of general circulation with
substantial interest in the processes of government, such as Science"' and
the National Welfare Rights Organization's Welfare Fighter,"' while per-
mitting the accreditation of journals whose interest in national affairs is
relatively insignificant, such as Western Stamp Collector."9
Similarly, rule two poorly fits the purpose of preventing abuse of access
privileges by lobbyists acting under the guise of journalists. The rule is
underinclusive because it allows the representatives of many interest groups
to have access to the galleries. The press is itself an interest group,
concerned about securing special favors in areas such as postal rates. 2 '
Correspondents from the trade journals represent such interests as public
utilities, the lumber industry, and the oil and gas industry.' 2 ' Rule two is
overinclusive because it denies access to affiliated journals that will not
abuse the privilege of access as well as those that will. The overinclusive-
ness of rule two suggests the availability of a less restrictive means of
achieving the goal of preventing lobbying by the members of the press.
Barring in advance those who might lobby is unnecessarily restrictive upon
the First Amendment rights of journals affiliated with associations or institu-
tions. A ban on lobbying by correspondents, with provisions for discipline if
it is transgressed, would suffice.
Rule two is also vulnerable because of the arbitrariness with which it
has been administered.' 22 Consumer Reports has been excluded, while Na-
tional Geographic, which is the official journal of an association, The Na-
117. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, at 18, Consumers Union of United States,
Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
118. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n,
365 F. Supp. 18, 23 (D.D.C. 1973).
119. CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 958, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
120. Bagdikian, First Amendment Revisionism, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 39
(May-June 1974).
121. See CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 957, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
122. To the extent that Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974),
might suggest by analogy that rule two does not infringe First Amendment rights, the
arbitrariness with which the rule in this case has been administered distinguishes Consum-
ers Union and suggests the inapplicability of Lehman. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974) and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974), may be distinguishable
on the same grounds.
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tional Geographic Society, has been accredited to the gallery.123 There is no
compelling justification for this kind of administration.
Although they are present, the considerations that might counsel
against judicial review in press access cases, as discussed above, are not as
strong in Consumers Union. The court of appeals erred in holding that the
case was nonjusticiable because there had been a "textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment. ' 12 4 It is true that the selective access in Consumers Union was gov-
erned by a congressional rule made pursuant to the rulemaking power of
each house, but this power is an insufficient basis for finding the "commit-
ment of the issue" that would be an absolute bar to suit. When a congres-
sional rule allegedly infringes constitutional rights, a court may review the
case because "Congress may not by its rules ignore constitutional re-
straints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be obtained." 2 ' Legislative prerogatives
would not be seriously impaired by an adjudication of the complaint in
Consumers Union. Congress has made the initial policy decision to establish
certain relatively formal channels of communication-press conferences,
press galleries-that are generally open to the press. Once this policy deci-
sion has been made, a court may enter to set the limits of legislative discre-
tion in administering those channels. Classification according to content,
which bears no substantial relationship to the end sought, is impermissible.
For a court to articulate this boundary is not the assumption of a legislative
task, but the execution of a judicial one.
The importance of equal access for affiliated journals may outweigh
any concern that a decision in favor of Consumers Union would open flood-
gates of litigation challenging other, less reviewable, practices. Affiliated
journals serve two important social functions. They contribute to public
understanding of government and society by providing detailed analyses of
issues from the perspective of particular political or economic groups or
technical specialties; the close focus of these journals on particular aspects
of national affairs complements the broad reporting of the newspapers and
news magazines. Affiliated journals also express the opinions of various
interest groups, a necessary task in a society in which citizens are to make
123. CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 957, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
124. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), quoted in Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1347 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
125. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
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their own determination of the truth from the comparison of different "in-
terested" viewpoints. In order to carry out both of these functions, affiliated
journals need equal access to government information. To perform their
educational tasks effectively, affiliated journals must be able to choose
among the primary data rather than rely on the selections that news journals,
with different purposes, have made. To perform their expressive function
credibly, affiliated journals must have access to government sources; other-
wise, both the public and its representatives may correctly dismiss the opin-
ions expressed as uninformed.
The theory that issues of press access to government processes and
information should be left to the "tug and pull of political forces"12 is not
precisely applicable to this case. It may be reasonable to leave to political
forces the question of what government information is available to the press
and public. The Constitution does not clearly protect a certain level of
information access, but the need of' officials for publicity and response
guarantees it. On the other hand, it is not practical to abandon the question
of who among the press will have access to political forces. The Constitution
does provide standards for treatment of the press in this regard; discrimina-
tion according to content of a speech or publication is prohibited. This
protection is available because the political process requires the expression
of diverse points of view but cannot be relied upon to protect them.
This dilemma is evident in Consumers Union. The dispute in Consum-
ers Union is between government and the press and between two segments
of the press, one of which Congress has deputized. This latter segment is
apparently using its power to grant credentials to maintain a "news
consensus'"-uncontroversial reporting that does not alienate news sources
within the government and that reduces competition among reporters on the
beat.12 The political force that excluded journals can exert on the Periodical
Correspondents Association or on Congress is minimal. If an affiliated jour-
nal is denied access it can do little in response. Appeals by the press to the
agents enforcing the rule, to the public, or to government officials are likely
to be ineffectual as they were in Consumers Union; separately, affiliated
journals simply do not have political clout, and it is unlikely that journals
with such diverse allegiances would or could band together.
Conclusion
The extent of government officials' discretion to choose which mem-
bers of the press will have access to government information, and the wis-
126. See text accompanying notes 100-01 supra.
127. L. SIGAL, REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS 53 (1973).
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dom of calling upon courts to decide this issue, are problems not susceptible
of easy solution. Although judicial inquiry is not absolutely precluded by the
speech or debate clause, it is impeded by a number of considerations.
Absent a statutory right of access like that provided for documentary infor-
mation under the Freedom of Information Act," 8 the grounds for asserting
any right of access are uncertain. Under current Supreme Court decisions, it
is doubtful that the press has rights of access greater than those of the public,
but even if it does the question remains how the press shall be defined. First
Amendment case law dealing with access to public forums suggests that the
government may not define or select members of the press in an arbitrary or
discriminatory fashion, but the cases provide no standards for discovering in
what instances this right of equal access applies. Finally, judicial interven-
tion might constitute an inappropriate meddling in the political process.
The court in Consumers Union might have refrained from adjudicating
the case on the ground that it was an inappropriate subject for judicial
review, in light of the above considerations. Alternatively, it could have
found standards and reasons for adjudicating this case and for granting
judgment for the plaintiff. The court of appeals chose neither of these
alternatives. It failed to come to grips with the complexity of the equal
access issue and thereby established a precedent both unfortunate and
dangerous. In dismissing the suit on the ground of legislative immunity
under the speech or debate clause, the court fashioned the shield of immu-
nity into a cudgel. The provision, which was intended to encourage congres-
sional discussion and debate, was used to allow Congress to choose who
could listen to that debate. The appellate court's holding in regard to the
speech or debate clause has broader implications, as well, since it suggests
that if Congress were to limit access to its proceedings by members of the
public or press on the basis of clearly unconstitutional distinctions, this
action would also be beyond judicial review. Finally, the court's decision
was doubly unfortunate because it cast a shadow on the developing body of
case law guaranteeing protection against discrimination on the basis ,of con-
tent for members of the press who cover state government,' 29 and because it
overlooked the important role that affiliated journals play in interpreting
American government and society. In attempting to protect the right of
Congress to free speech and debate, the court of appeals stifled that of the
public.
128. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West Supp. 4, pt. 1, 1976) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
129. Main Road v. Aytch, 522 F.2d 1080 (3d Cir. 1975) (city jail officials may not
permit some interviews of prisoners while denying others on the ground of the "sensitiv-
ity of the topics to be discussed"; Pell and Washington Post distinguished because policy
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in this case was not applied uniformly and nondiscriminatorily); Westinghouse Broadcast-
ing Co. v. Dukakis, 409 F. Supp. 895 (D. Mass. 1976) (order of the Boston city council
excluding plaintiff's radio and television stations from council meetings infringed the sta-
tions' constitutional rights); Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906 (D. Hawaii 1974) (pre-
liminary injunction issued against mayor's exclusion of a particular reporter from his press
conferences because the reporter frequently criticized the mayor in his columns); Lewis v.
Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (declaratory judgment and injunction against
enforcement of section of state ethics statute that conditioned reporters' admission to gal-
leries, press conferences, and other facilities upon submission of a statement of economic
interests); Quad-City Community News Serv., Inc. v. Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Iowa
1971) (officials' policy of allowing "established" press to have press passes and access to
records, while denying such passes and access to so-called underground press declared
unconstitutional and enjoined). Contra, Los Angeles Free Press, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, 9 Cal. App. 3d 448, 88 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 982
(1971) (permissible for city and county officials to deny press pass to plaintiff on the
ground that it was a "specialized " journal that did not gather and distribute spot police
and fire news).
